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Harvest Rules When Price Depends On
Quantity: The Case of Norwegian Spring
Spawning Herring (Clupea harengus L.)
PER SANDBERG
Institute of Marine Research
Abstract   For fish stocks where the unit price of harvest is constant and unit
harvest costs are independent of quantity and non-increasing in biomass, regu-
lation based on target escapement (TE) has been shown to optimise the net
present value (NPV) of harvest to society. This result has also been shown to
hold for fish stocks characterised by stochastic recruitment, whereas a more as-
ymptotic approach has been advocated if price depends on quantity. In this
paper, these theoretical results are empirically investigated. Our case is the
Norwegian spring spawning herring fishery, a stock with stochastic recruitment
and price decreasing in harvest. For this fishery, the theoretical results are veri-
fied in that TE can no longer claim optimality. At constant prices, TE is found to
outperform a more gradual approach, but this comes at a cost of a lower ex-
pected spawning stock at the end of the period investigated.
Key words   Fisheries management, harvest rules, target escapement, herring.
JEL Classification Codes  Q22, Q28.
Introduction
Regulating catch levels by harvest rules is a widely used management tool in fisher-
ies. Clark (1976) showed that a target escapement (TE) rule is optimal for a fishery
characterised by known or deterministic changes in the population parameters of the
stock, by unit harvest costs non-increasing in biomass, and importantly, by fish
stocks facing infinitely elastic demand. Clark showed that the net present value
(NPV) of the fishery is maximised by attaining the TE level as rapidly as possible.
This implies no fishing when the biomass is below the target level and maximum
fishing effort when the biomass is above the target level. This is defined as a “bang-
bang” harvest rule and implementation requires only rules setting the conditions for
closure of a fishery.1
Reed (1979) relaxed Clark’s strict assumption of known or deterministic
changes in the population parameters of the stock and showed that a TE rule is opti-
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mal for fish stocks characterised by stochastic recruitment. Reed’s model assumes
fish prices constant in catch level and unit harvest costs independent of biomass. In-
terestingly, Reed’s optimal escapement level is no smaller than the optimal
escapement level for Clark’s more restrictive case. However, stochastic recruitment
causes stock fluctuations around the TE level, resulting in stochastic closure of the
fishery; a policy that may be hard to implement in practice.2
The assumption of constant fish prices or, in other words, an infinitely elastic
demand is crucial to both Clark and Reed’s outcome. In fact, Reed acknowledges
that the optimality of a TE rule may be violated if this assumption does not hold, an
insight already made by Clark and Munro (1975). In the latter paper, it was shown
that, when faced with finite price elasticity, the bang-bang approach implies penal-
ties. In such a case the authors show that the target (stock) level should be
approached by an asymptotic rather than a most rapid approach.
The contribution of this study is to empirically investigate these results. To do
this, a TE rule is compared to an ad hoc rule defined by fisheries managers under
three scenarios: (i) price is constant in catch level; (ii) price is decreasing in catch
level; and (iii) a relative comparison of performance of the two rules in a depleted
stock environment. The rule, defined by the managers, is characterised by target
fishing mortality rather than TE, and can be seen as an approximation to the asymp-
totic rule recommended by Clark and Munro (1975) in the case of finite price
elasticity.
The comparison is carried out using a bioeconomic model. Data used in mea-
surement and testing are from the Norwegian spring spawning herring (Clupea harengus
L.) fishery, the largest pelagic fish stock in the Northeast Atlantic. This fish stock is
characterised by stochastic recruitment and price decreasing in harvest level.
The paper is organised as follows: First, the fish stock and the fishery is de-
scribed. Then the bioeconomic model is presented. Thereafter, results are provided,
and conclusions are drawn in the end.
The Fish Stock and the Fishery
The Fish Stock
Norwegian spring spawning herring is a pelagic fish stock, forming schools. It
spawns off the coast of southern Norway during late winter/early spring, and its off-
spring are transported by the coastal current northwards to the Barents Sea. After
spawning, mature herring follow a clockwise feeding migration in the Norwegian
Sea, returning to the fjords in Northern Norway in the autumn. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of herring.
The size of the spawning stock biomass (SSB) of Norwegian spring spawning
herring varies considerably. The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
(ICES) estimated the SSB in 1950 at 12.7 million tonnes, whereas it collapsed to 0.3
million tonnes in the early 1970s (ICES 2003a). During the latter half of the 1980s
and the early 1990s, the stock recovered. In 2003, ICES reckons an SSB of approxi-
mately 5 million tonnes (ICES 2003b) (figure 2).
2 In practice, such a policy would bear substantial adjustment costs, as many input factors are fixed to
the fishery with little or no alternative use. Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979) addressed the consequences
of capital lacking malleability for optimal exploitation of renewable resources. In lack of malleable
capital (or labour) the authors found the target escapement approach no longer to be optimal. Their re-
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Figure 2 shows a stock with great fluctuations. In Toresen and Østvedt (2000),
the authors conclude that these fluctuations are caused by variations in the survival
of recruits, which, in turn, is caused by environmental factors. Since environmental
influence on recruitment cannot fully be explained, this paper will treat the influ-
ence of the environment as stochastic (see the Appendix).
During the 1960s, vessels with efficient fish-finding equipment maintained a
profitable fishery on a rapidly decreasing stock. During this period, the fishery was
also a main factor in the deterioration of the stock. Dragesund, Hamre, and Ulltang
(1980) provide a thorough description of biological characteristics of this herring
stock.
Figure 1.  Distribution and Migration Pattern for Norwegian Spring Spawning Herring
Note: The shaded area shows the current distribution of herring, whereas the black arrows show inflows
of warm Atlantic water (the Gulf Stream).Sandberg 290
The International Management of the Fishery
Norwegian spring spawning herring is a straddling fish stock. During its feeding mi-
gration, it crosses the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of several nations. Fishing
vessels from the European Union, Faeroe Islands, Iceland, Norway, and Russia ex-
ploit the stock. Since 1996, these nations, denoted the Parties or the managers, have
agreed to regulate the annual harvest from the stock by a total allowable catch
(TAC), divided by fixed shares.3
Since 2001, the TAC has been fixed according to a harvest rule established by
the five parties. This rule states that when the SSB is assessed to be below 2.5 mil-
lion tonnes, the fishing mortality should be 0.05. When SSB is above 5.0 million
tonnes, the fishing mortality should be 0.125, and when the SSB is between 2.5 and
5.0 million tonnes, the fishing mortality should increase linearly from 0.05 to 0.125.
Figure 3 illustrates the harvest rule adopted by the managers.
Prior to adoption of the rule, its performance was evaluated using medium-term
simulations (Bogstad et al. 2000). The performance indicators calculated were ex-
pected development of catch and spawning stock (including the risk of bringing the
stock below safe biological limits of 2.5 million tonnes). However, the expected NPV of
the rule was not calculated, nor was the rule compared with a TE rule. However, one
obvious difference between the applied rule and a TE rule can be seen directly from
figure 3.  In the applied rule, the fishery will be open at all stock levels, whereas this
will not be the case when following a TE rule (with a positive target level).
Assessing the stock and using the ad hoc rule indicates the fishing mortality in a
particular year. Subsequently, the TAC is found by multiplying the fishing mortality
by the assessed spawning stock. As such, the rule has some of the characteristics of
a feedback rule in that the TAC is annually modified by the latest stock assessment.
Feedback rules for resource management have been discussed in several papers (see
Sandal and Steinshamn 1997, 2001).  For a more thorough discussion of this rule,
see Røttingen (2003).
Figure 2.  Spawning Stock Biomass of Norwegian
Spring Spawning Herring 1950–2003
3 Since 2003, the question of allocation has been reopened. Currently, there is no agreement on how to
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The international management of this fish stock is, therefore, restricted to a har-
vest rule and an allocation of the resulting quota among the Parties.  In addition,
there are limitations regarding each Party’s access to fish their shares in other Par-
ties’ EEZs, and a general minimum landing size of 25 cm. Within these constraints,
each Party is free to manage its fishery according to its own national objectives.
The Economics and Management of the Norwegian Fishery on Herring
The Norwegian vessels fishing herring can be categorised into three technologically
distinct fleets: coastal vessels, purse seiners, and pelagic trawlers. What distin-
guishes the fleets from one another is the size of the vessels, the range of operation,
and, to some extent, the fishing gear. These technological differences imply that
both revenue and costs vary substantially between the fleets (Norwegian Directorate
of Fisheries; Sandberg 2005).
The coastal vessels are the smallest, with an overall length below 27.5 metres.
These vessels target both demersal species, like cod and haddock, as well as pelagic
species, such as saithe, herring, and mackerel. They generally operate close to the
Norwegian shore.
The purse seiners are by far the largest vessels, with the most modern fishery
equipment. They target a wide range of pelagic species, including mackerel, herring,
capelin, horse mackerel, blue whiting, and sprat. The area of operation covers the
Barents Sea in the north, the North Sea in the south, and areas west of the British
Isles, as well as Icelandic waters in the northwest.
The pelagic trawlers are generally smaller in size than the purse seiners. Their
main fishery targets sandeel, blue whiting, and Norway pout. In addition to this,
they fish herring, mackerel, and capelin. The area of operation is mostly the North
Sea, but capelin and herring are caught along the Norwegian coast.
For several years, Norway has been allocated 57% of the TAC. The distribution
of the Norwegian quota among the three fleets follows an allocation key proposed
Figure 3.  The Harvest Rule Adopted by the Managers of
Norwegian Spring Spawning HerringSandberg 292
by the fishing industry. The key is dynamic and shown in Sandberg (2004). At low quota
levels, coastal vessels are favoured, whereas purse seiners and pelagic trawlers are
favoured at high quota levels. The allocation key does not optimise economic revenue
from the catch, but is the result of a bargaining process between the vessel groups.4
The price which Norwegian fishermen obtain for their catch of Norwegian
spring spawning herring will be determined by its supply and that of a close substi-
tute (North Sea herring) and the demand for the various products derived from these
fisheries. The supply of herring from both stocks is regulated by output controls
(quotas) that are established annually by the management authorities. The Director-
ate of Fisheries records prices of the individual landings.
Within each fleet segment, the vessels are regulated through individual vessel
quotas. Faced with such an output control, profit-maximising behaviour by the ves-
sel owners will imply incentives to minimise costs. All vessel groups target several
species, but the herring fishery is not a mixed fishery. The variable unit costs for
each of the three vessel groups fishing Norwegian spring spawning herring were es-
timated in Sandberg (2005) and will be used in this paper. These unit costs are
non-increasing in both catch and biomass.
The Bioeconomic Model
Both aggregate growth models and disaggregated cohort models have been applied
in previous papers dealing with Norwegian spring spawning herring. Arnason,
Magnusson, and Agnarsson (2001) use an aggregated growth function when assess-
ing game theoretic aspects related to the stock.5 Lindroos (2004) and Bjørndal et al.
(2004) use disaggregated cohort models in their analysis of other game theoretic as-
pects of the same stock.
In this paper, the objective is an empirical investigation of harvest rules for a
fish stock where one of the natural population parameters—recruitment—is stochas-
tic. In order to capture the stochastic recruitment process, this paper relies on a
disaggregated cohort model, outlined in the Appendix.
The two harvest rules are measured by the expected net present value, E(NPV),
during a 50-year period. The E(NPV) can be written as:
E(NPV) = Pf ,y(·) - Cf ,y(·) é ë ù û * Yf ,y * (1 + r)-y { }
f ,y å , (1)
where Pf,y(·) = average price of herring for fleet  f in year  y; Cf,y(·) = variable unit
costs of fishing herring for fleet f in year y ; Yf,y = catch / quota for fleet f in year y;
and (1 + r)–y = discount factor.
The catch, or quota, per fleet per year is determined by the harvest rule, the dy-
namics of the fish stock, how large a share of the TAC is allocated to Norway, and
the allocation between vessel groups. In this paper, the Beverton-Holt model will be
used to model Y as a function of the harvest rule. The expected NPV for the Nor- -
wegian catch of Norwegian spring spawning herring can then be written as:
4 For an introduction to some main elements of Norway’s fisheries management, see Årland and
Bjørndal (2002).
5 However, when estimating the parameters in the growth function for Norwegian spring spawning her-
ring, Arnason, Magnusson, and Agnarsson (2001) did not find them to be statistically valid.Harvest Rules when Price Depends on Quantity 293
E(NPV) = Pf ,y(·) - Cf ,y(·) é ë ù û {
y,a, f å * K f * S (2)
* 
Fy,aNy,a 1 - e
-(Fy,a +My,a ) é ë ù û
Fy,a + M y,a
WCy,a * (1 + r)-y},
where Ny,0 = Ry; Fy,a = fishing mortality (the control variable) directed towards year
class (cohort) a in year y; WCy,a = weight of fish (in catch) at age a in year y; My,a =
natural mortality of cohort a in year y; Kf = fleet specific share of Norwegian quota;
and S = the Norwegian share of the TAC.
As mentioned earlier, three technologically different fleets harvest herring. One
important technological feature that distinguishes the fleets is the on-board storage
facilities for transporting the catch over long distances. The purse seiners have such
facilities to a much greater extent than the coastal vessels and pelagic trawlers. We
may, therefore, assume that the catch taken by purse seiners is supplied to a larger
market than the catch taken by coastal vessels and pelagic trawlers.
Based on this assumption, separate price functions for each of the three fleets
were estimated, and it was found that the elasticity of price with respect to harvest
was to –0.29, –0.31, and –0.34, respectively, for the three vessel groups (Sandberg
2004). These elasticities were not statistically different between the vessel groups,
but they were still used when simulating the E(NPV) of the two harvest rules.
Hannesson (1993) discusses how two different categories of harvest rules (TE
and target fishing mortality) will imply different levels of optimal fishing capacity
and, as a consequence, different levels of fixed costs. Optimal level of fishing ca-
pacity is not addressed in this paper, where the cost figures used reflect average
variable unit costs for the existing fleets.
A discrete fishing mortality (F) per year is the control variable. For the two har-
vest rules, F will depend upon the assessed SSB as follows:
(1) Target Escapement Rule
F = 0 when SSB < target escapement (TE)
F = Fte when SSB > target escapement (TE),
where Fte is the fishing mortality necessary to fish any SSB level above TE down to
the TE level during a year. During the 1990s, the annual catches from the stock var-
ied between 0.09 and 1.4 million tonnes. It will, therefore, be assumed that the
annual catches are not restricted by capacity constraints.
(2) Harvest Rule Established by Managers
F = 0.05 when SSB < 2.5 million tonnes
F = linearly developing from 0.05 at SSB = 2.5 m.t. to 0.125 at SSB = 5.0 m.t.
F = 0.125 when SSB > 2.5 m.t.
Both harvest rules are specified with a discrete (within season), annual fishing
mortality, whereas the optimal (TE) rule discussed by Reed (1979) was given by aSandberg 294
continuous fishing mortality.6 Biological, fishery, and economic data are given in
Sandberg (2004).
Based on the bioeconomic model described above, the E(NPV) of the two rules
was calculated. Since this indicator depends on interplay between the rule and the
fish stock, it is necessary to evaluate the consequences over a certain time span. A
50-year period is chosen, which is more than sufficient to include long-term conse-
quences of the rules.
Due to the stochastic recruitment function, 500 replicas of the calculations were
performed. Based on these calculations, the expected NPV over the 50-year period,
as shown in equation (2), was calculated. Even for a period of 50 years, large differ-
ences in the initial stock will influence the results. To illuminate this aspect, the
consequences of both rules were simulated on the basis of two different initial stock
levels.
Results
The E(NPV) and the expected spawning stock biomass, E(SSB), of TE levels from 1
to 7 million tonnes were evaluated and contrasted with the E(NPV) and the E(SSB)
of the ad hoc rule.7 First, a comparison was based on constant prices, second on
prices decreasing in harvest, and finally on the performance of each rule in a de-
pleted stock environment.
Constant Prices
The level of constant prices was set to the average real price for each fleet during
the period 1990–2000. Table 1 shows the E(NPV) and E(SSB) of each rule over a
50-year period.8
Table 1 shows that when prices are constant, E(NPV) is considerably higher,
and the E(SSB) considerably lower, when adopting a TE policy than when adopting
the ad hoc rule established by the fishery managers. The simulations show that
E(NPV) is maximised at a TE of approximately 2 million tonnes where the E(NPV)
is 53% higher than the E(NPV) when following the ad hoc rule. Thus, when prices
are constant (demand is infinitely elastic), and society has no concern about E(SSB)
at the end of the simulation period, Reed’s conclusion regarding the optimality of
TE rules is not challenged by our empirical investigation of the Norwegian spring
spawning herring fishery.
As mentioned, the expected SSB at the end of the simulation period is much
lower for the optimal TE rule than for the rule established by the managers of the
stock. This “mining” aspect explains much of the higher E(NPV) of the TE rule
compared to the more asymptotic rule established by the managers of the stock.
When applying the latter, the E(SSB) at the end of the simulation period is 6.0 mil-
lion tonnes. The table shows that to obtain the same E(SSB) with a TE rule, the TE
6 Since a harvest rule characterised by a continuous fishing mortality may perform better, its discrete
version cannot claim to be optimal.
7 The interval of 1 to 7 million tonnes covers SSB levels below safe biological limits (2.5 million
tonnes) and above the levels where E(NPV) reaches its maximum.
8 When increasing the TE level, the corresponding E(SSB) at the end of the simulation period is not
identical to the TE level, but lower. This reflects that at higher TE levels, the stochastic recruitment
function is not able to fully compensate the withdrawal from the stock, which a fishery based on target
escapement implies.Harvest Rules when Price Depends on Quantity 295
would have to be set at some level between 6 and 7 million tonnes. At such a TE
level, the E(NPV) of the TE rule comes close to the E(NPV) of the rule established
by the managers. Thus, if society aims for a target value of the stock at the end of
the simulation period, for example 6 million tonnes, the two rules are approximately
equal regarding the E(NPV).
It should also be noted that if a TE rule were adopted, escapement levels be-
tween 3 and 4 million tonnes produces E(NPV) in the vicinity of what an
escapement level of 2 million tonnes would produce (98 and 95% respectively). To a
manager  concerned  with  stock  conservation  as  an  additional  objective  to
maximising E(NPV), this implies the following: Regarding Norwegian spring
spawning herring, a doubling of the TE level from 2 to 4 million tonnes can be
achieved at a reasonable (low) cost, equivalent to 5% foregone net revenue during a
50-year period. These TE levels are close to the level which Arnason, Magnusson,
and Agnarsson (2001) found when evaluating optimal stock size with an aggregate
surplus production model (4.2 million tonnes).
As mentioned, the TE with a most rapid approach implies a stochastic bang-
bang regulation (stochastic opening and closure of the fishery). Figure 4 shows the
median, 25, and 5 percentile of forecasted harvest when adopting a TE rule (left
panel) and the ad hoc rule established by the managers (right panel). In the TE rule,
the median catch is around 200,000 tonnes (much lower than the mean of 794,000
tonnes), but the variability of the harvest is so high that the 5% percentiles are be-
yond the scale from zero to 1.4 million tonnes. This is in sharp contrast to the ad
hoc rule, where 90% of the projections imply harvest between 0.1 and 1.3 million
tonnes.
The adjustment costs of the stochastic variations in harvest levels will not be
dealt with in this paper, but figure 4 emphasizes another question.  Is it reasonable
to assume that prices for the product will remain constant for the highly variable
catches that a TE policy would imply? If not, does the price effect imply that the
optimality of a TE rule is challenged? We now turn to an empirical assessment of
this question.
Table 1
The Expected Net Present Value and Spawning Stock Biomass when
Applying TE from 1 to 7 Million Tonnes and the Ad hoc Rule Applied
by Managers of the Stock (Price Independent of Harvest)
Target Escapement Expected Net Present Expected Spawning








Ad hoc Rule 6,048 6.0
Note: Expected net present value of harvest and expected spawning stock biomass, respectively, during
and after a simulation period of 50 years. Discount rate set to 5% p.a.Sandberg 296
Prices Decreasing in Harvest
When price of harvest depends on quantity, the E(NPV) of the various harvest rules
falls. This is caused by the average prices in the rules that are severely reduced by
the harvest levels.9 Table 2 shows the E(NPV) and E(SSB) of TE rules (with various
targets) and the ad hoc harvest rule established by the stock managers when prices
decrease in harvest.
At the output elasticities of price as shown above, the optimality of a TE rule is
challenged by the ad hoc rule established by the managers. For the output elasticity
of price, as estimated for the Norwegian vessel groups, the E(NPV) of the ad hoc
rule is 57% higher than the E(NPV) of a TE rule. Furthermore, the simulations show
that when prices are no longer constant, but decreasing in catches, the escapement
level that produces highest E(NPV) increases from 2 to 5 million tonnes.
Thus, the simulations show that when price is decreasing in harvest, the TE
policy is not superior to the ad hoc rule established by the managers of the stock.
Although this rule implies lower mean catches from year to year than the TE rule,10
it mitigates against the adverse effect that the bang-bang regulation has on prices.
The ad hoc rule established by the managers of this fish stock implies a much more
gradual approximation to the target stock level than the bang-bang approach. As
such, our simulation results provide an empirical verification of the asymptotic ap-
proach which Clark and Munro (1975) found to be optimal for stocks where price
depends on harvest.
Figure 4.  Stochastic Forecasts of 500 Replicates of Harvest per Year in a 50-year Period
Note: The bold line represents the median, while the thin lines represent the 25% and 5% percentiles
above and below the median. The left panel represents the catch forecasts of a TE rule at a target level
of 5 million tonnes. The right panel represents the catch forecast of the ad hoc rule established by the
coastal states.
9 An additional explanation for the reduced level of E(NPV) in table 2 relative to table 1 is the  high
constant prices applied.
10 The simulations show that the mean catch from the ad hoc rule was 734,000 tonnes compared to
794,000 tonnes for the TE rule.Harvest Rules when Price Depends on Quantity 297
A Depleted Stock Environment
The harvest rules discussed above are specified for the entire range of possible
spawning stock levels. However, when the consequences of the two sets of rules
were evaluated, the initial level of SSB was set to the level assessed in 2003, ap-
proximately 5 million tonnes. With such a starting point, the specified stock
dynamics and harvest rules will imply a low risk of depleting the spawning stock.
With a stochastic recruitment function, there is a risk of a series of years with
bad recruitment. The stock is a schooling species, vulnerable to exploitation even at
very low stock levels. Figure 1 shows that once a collapse has occurred, it might
take a long time before the stock recovers. In such a depleted stock environment,
managers will also be required to manage the resource in accordance with the rel-
evant articles in the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1982) and the United Nations
Fish Stock Agreement (United Nations 1995). In particular, the latter stresses the re-
quirements to manage a straddling fish stock, such as the Norwegian spring
spawning herring, with a precautionary approach. In point 5 of Annex II of the
United Nations Fish Stock Agreement it is stated that, “If a stock falls below a limit
reference point or is at risk of falling below such a reference point, conservation and
management action should be initiated to facilitate stock recovery.”
To evaluate how the rules perform to facilitate stock recovery, initial spawning
stock was set to its historic level of 0.3 million tonnes in 1975. This level was cho-
sen to mimic a collapsed stock. With this as a starting point, the consequences of a
TE rule (5 million tonnes) and the harvest rule established by the managers were
simulated. The simulation period was set to 50 years and 500 replicates were made.
Biological and economic parameters were set as in Sandberg (2004) with prices de-
creasing in catches. Table 3 shows the performance of each harvest rule in relation
to our indicators.
In a depleted stock environment, Table 3 shows that the mean catch over a 50-
year period is higher when adopting a TE rule than the ad hoc rule established by
the managers. However, when the TE rule is applied in a depleted stock environ-
ment, the fishery will be closed for a long period. Such closure will not be a feature
of the harvest rule adopted by the stock managers.  In the latter, the fishery will be
Table 2
The Expected Net Present Value and Spawning Stock Biomass when
Applying TE from 1 to 7 Million Tonnes and the Ad hoc Rule Applied
by Managers of the Stock (Price Decreasing in Harvest)
Target Escapement Expected Net Present Expected Spawning








Ad hoc Rule 3,265 5.9
Note: Expected net present value of harvest and expected spawning stock biomass, respectively, during
and after a simulation period of 50 years. Discount rate set to 5% p.a.Sandberg 298
open even at low stock levels. The small quotas or catch levels generated by the rule
will obtain high prices. Thus, the E(NPV) is nearly 2.7 times higher when following the
harvest rule adopted by the managers than when following the TE rule. So, empirically,
the optimality of the TE rule with respect to expected NPV does not hold for the Nor-
wegian spring spawning herring either in a depleted or non-depleted state.11
Furthermore, Table 3 shows that at the end of a 50-year period, expected SSB
will be slightly higher when applying a TE rule with a target of 5 million tonnes
than when applying the ad hoc rule established by the managers. The table also
shows that the probability that the stock will be below the reference point during the
simulation period will be lower when applying the TE rule than when applying the
ad hoc rule. Figure 5 illustrates this.
Figure 5 shows that the TE rule implies a faster stock recovery than the harvest
rule adopted by the fishery managers. Concerned both with expected NPV and stock
recovery, managers face a tradeoff when choosing among harvest rules.
Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to empirically investigate some previous theo-
retical results related to what can be considered optimal harvest rules for fish stocks,
in particular the results by Clark and Munro (1975), Clark (1976), and Reed (1979).
For the fishery analysed, the findings indicate that at the constant price assumption,
the TE rule outperforms the rule established by the fishery managers, but a large
part of the higher E(NPV) of the TE rules is earned by mining down the stock. If
society has the same target for E(SSB) after a simulation period of 50 years, the
E(NPV) of the two rules comes very close.
When the constant price assumption is relaxed, TE can no longer claim
optimality. This result was theoretical established by Clark and Munro (1975), and
the simulation results of the current paper provide empirical verification to their
theoretical result.
This result also holds in a depleted stock environment. However, if in a depleted
stock environment a most rapid recovery is the only objective for fishery managers,
TE performs better than the ad hoc rule. Finally, if both E(NPV) and stock recovery
Table 3
Performance Indicators when Applying Two Different Harvest Rules to
the Norwegian Spring Spawning Herring Stock in a Period of Recovery
Expected Net Probability that Expected SSB
Mean Annual Present Value SSB will Drop at End of
Harvest Rule Harvest of Harvest Below 2.5 MT Simulation Period
Target Escapement 0.26 326 56% 4.3
Ad hoc Rule 0.22 869 70% 4.2
Note: Simulation period is 50 years. Discount rate set to 5% p.a.
11 This result is caused by the prices decreasing in harvest. Keeping prices constant, the expected NPV
of a target escapement was found to be higher than the corresponding value of the ad hoc rule (1,269
and 791 million NOK, respectively).Harvest Rules when Price Depends on Quantity 299
are relevant objectives, the choice of harvest rule will depend upon the tradeoff be-
tween the two objectives.
This result makes good intuitive sense: the optimality of the TE rule, as estab-
lished by Clark (1976) and Reed (1979), is based on assumptions about infinitely
elastic demand and unit harvesting costs that are independent of quantity and do not
increase as the size of the fish stock increases. Under these assumptions, the ques-
tion of harvest rule is solely dependent upon a comparison between the marginal
rate of return from the stock, on the one hand, and the discount rate of the society on
the other. If the marginal rate of return from the stock is higher than the discount
rate, a closure of the fishery will be the optimal decision and vice versa. Thus, the
TE level can be found where the marginal rate of return from the stock equals the
discount rate of society.
When the assumption of constant prices, or infinitely elastic demand, is relaxed,
a market effect becomes relevant when deciding upon harvest rule. Taking this into
account, the E(NPV) of the harvest will be higher if it can be supplied at quantities
that vary less from year to year than they would given a TE.
As already touched upon in the introduction, there is another reason for not us-
ing TE rules in practical fishery management. This is the substantial adjustment cost
which the bang-bang consequences of a TE policy would imply. The consequences
that these costs have on optimal exploitation of renewable resources were theoreti-
cally demonstrated by Clark, Clarke, and Munro (1979), and empirical verification
of their findings should be of interest for future research.
We do not claim that the ad hoc rule established by the managers is optimal, but
the simulations show that it is superior to the TE rule at the output elasticities of
price used in this paper. Another harvest rule whose consequences would be of inter-
est to evaluate would be a TE strategy in which the annual TAC is not allowed to
exceed specific levels.
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Appendix
The Biological Sub-Model
In an age-structured (cohort) model, there are four components determining the size
and development of a fish stock: Recruitment, individual growth, natural mortality,
and the fishery. For Norwegian spring spawning herring, recruitment is most vari-
able, and an important element when considering appropriate management measures
for the stock.
Recruitment of new year-classes of herring is expected to depend both on the
size of the spawning stock and the environment (Toresen and Østvedt 2000). The in-
fluence of the environment makes recruitment stochastic, which implies large
variation in the strength of year-classes. Due to this feature, a year-class model rep-
resents the stock better than an aggregate surplus production model.
Recruitment, and the subsequent calculation of number of individuals in each
year-class during their life span, depart from the model developed by Beverton and
Holt (1957):
Ry = Rmax * {Xy / (Xhalf + Xy)} + ey, (A1)
where  Ry = recruitment in billions in year y; Rmax = maximum recruitment; Xy =
spawning stock in year y; Xhalf = spawning stock that produced one half of Rmax; and
ey = normally distributed error term.
The effect of the environment on recruitment is incorporated as follows.  First,
recruitment figures during the period 1950–2002 are divided in two subsets accord-
ing to whether or not they can be classified as years with a favourable environment.
The criterion for a year with a favourable environment is found by first solving
equation (A1) for Xhalf  each year. Low values of Xhalf indicate a year with a
favourable environment and vice versa. After ranking the years, 25% representing
the best years are put in one subset and 75% in the other. Second, equation (A1) was
estimated from each subset of recruitment figures.
Thus, two stochastic recruitment functions are estimated for the stock, one rep-
resenting generally unfavourable environmental conditions and the other favourable
environmental conditions. Third, prognostic recruitment is found by drawing 25% of
the replicates from the recruitment function estimated from the subset of data whenSandberg 302
environmental conditions were good and 75% from recruitment function when the
environmental conditions were bad. The effect of the environment is, therefore, in-
corporated in two ways; first by the choice of estimating two recruitment functions
and drawing prognostic recruitment from them, and second through the error term in
each recruitment function. ICES uses this method when giving medium-term predic-
tions for the stock of Norwegian spring spawning herring (ICES 2003a).
For each level of prognostic recruitment, the numbers of individuals can be
modelled year by year as:
Ny+ 1,a+1 = Ny ,ae
-Zy ,a , (A2)
where Ny,a = number of fish of age a at the start of year y; Zy,a = total mortality rate
of age a in year y; y = year; and a = age (years)
and
Ny,0 = Ry. (A3)
Equation (A2) states that the number of individuals,  N , in a cohort a in year y
will be reduced with the instant total mortality, Z, from the current year until the
next, y + 1. Equation (A4) defines the total mortality for a specific cohort in a spe-
cific year to be the sum of the fishing mortality and natural mortality:
Zy,a = Fy,a + M y,a, (A4)
where Fy,a = fishing mortality rate of age a in year y; and My,a = natural mortality
rate of age a in year y.
Equation A5 defines the catch of each year class in numbers of individuals re-
moved from a cohort multiplied by the share of the fishing mortality on the total
mortality:
Cy,a =
Fy,aNy,a 1 - e
-(Fy,a +My,a ) é ë ù û
Fy,a + M y,a
, (A5)
where Cy,a = catch in numbers of age, a, in year y.
Equations (A2) and (A5) describe how the number of individual fish in a cohort
and in the catch of the cohort develop as a function of natural mortality, M, and fish-
ing mortality, F. To find the biomass of a selected number of cohorts, a summation
of the numbers in each cohort multiplied with the average weight of the individual
fish is needed. To find the spawning stock (which size is expected to be important
for future recruitment) a multiplication of the numbers in each cohort with the share
being mature is needed. Equation (A6) identifies the SSB in year y:
Xy = Ny, aWSy, aOy, a
a å ,         0 £ Oy,a £ 1, (A6)
where WSy,a = weight of fish (in stock) at age a in year y; and Oy,a = maturity give
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The catch each year can now be calculated as the catch of each cohort in num-
bers multiplied by the average weight in that cohort, as stated in equation (A7):
Yy = Cy,a
a å WCy,a, (A7)
where Cy,a = catch in numbers at age a in year y; and WCy,a  = weight of fish (in
catch) at age a in year y.
Given knowledge about the numbers in the recruiting year-classes, the mortality
induced by the natural environment, the fishery, and the individual weight in each
cohort, the biomass of a cohort and the yield from a fishery on that cohort can be
calculated. To simulate the biomass of the stock, the spawning stock, or the catch
from the fishery in a given year, summation of the respective cohorts, and yield
from the cohorts in that year will be needed.
The relevance of explicitly modelling the fish stock when assessing the eco-
nomic yield of various harvest rules can be seen through these equations. A harvest
rule will imply a specific level of fishing mortality that will reduce the number of
individuals from one year to the next (equation A2). Indirectly, the fishing mortality
will also influence the size of the spawning stock (equation A6) and through this,
future recruitment (equation A1). Equation (A7) expresses the physical yield from
the fish stock as the product of catch in numbers and weight in catch. Catch in num-
bers is determined by equation (A5), and one has come full circle.
Different harvest rules will, therefore, lead to alternative development paths for
the stock biomass and the yield from the fishery. Both the biomass and the catch
will influence the economic yield from the harvest rule.